Between Rebellion and Politics-
Variance in Agency within Contentious Politics of the Philippines

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by

Katja Muñoz, IFSH

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Moderation: Prof. Dr. Thorsten Bonacker, Universität Marburg

Introduction

The increase in intra-state wars after World War II has been identified as one of the main reasons why non-state actors have come out of the periphery and became the center of attention in the media and public perception, as well as in research[1]. In light of this development, many different questions relating to these areas have already been explored; nevertheless, some spaces have yet to be tackled. This paper is part of a greater research project trying to close one of these gaps and specifically asks questions focusing on variance in agency - meaning why or how non-state actors decide on the nature of the activities (violent or nonviolent) when advancing a claim during contentious politics; a topic, which has only received scant attention[2] despite the existing burgeoning body of literature on non-state actors.

This paper represents the partial[3] evaluation of preliminary results concerning variance in agency of non-state actors using the approach suggested by the *Dynamics of Contention Program* (DOC) championed by Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly and by Tilly's later added theoretical extensions on regimes and repertoires of contention for studying contentious politics within the context of the People Power Revolution of the Philippines. Hence, the goal here is to shed light on the corresponding causality of non-state actors either employing violent or nonviolent means or a mix of both within contentious politics. Furthermore, this paper does not focus on the relative or absolute effectiveness of the means employed. For reasons of scope limitations, this paper dominantly focuses on the role of the political context of the Philippines in this respect. Particularly, to what extent context-dependency affects variance in agency by non-state actors during the contentious episode from 1983-1986. The definition of contentious politics or episodes, and of most of the terminology used, is linked to the conceptual approach proposed by the DOC and defined as "involving interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else's interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties" (Tilly, Tarrow 2007, p. 4); whereas episodes are defined as "bounded sequences of continuous interaction, usually produced by an investigator's chopping up longer streams of contention into segments for purposes of systematic observation, comparison, and explanation" (Tilly, Tarrow 2007, p. 36).

This study is organized in two parts. The first section outlines the DOC as theoretical framework to analyze variance in agency. It also introduces the analytical tools applied - the capacity-democracy space and the Political Opportunity Structure. The second section proceeds with

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[1] Major statistical evaluations seem to confirm the rising importance of non-state actors and their involvement in conflicts. In 2005 the *Uppsala Conflict Data Program* registered 121 armed conflicts, of which 90 are classified as 'intra-state conflicts' and 24 as 'internationalized intra-state conflicts'; at least one of the actors involved fits the typecast non state (armed) group (Harbom et al. 2006). *The Conflict Barometer* published in 2008 affirms this inclination (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research at the Department of Political Science, University of Heidelberg 2008). Others try to meet the research demands of this trend by digging in even further: the *Human Security Report* has adapted its system of categorization and added the tab 'non-state conflict', which only lists conflicts between (violent/nonviolent) non-state actor (Tilly 2006). Other projects collect data on the emerging protagonists as such: the *Minorities at Risk Project*, founded by Ted Robert Gurr, gathers data on over 300 ethno-political groups worldwide from 1946-2005 (Center for International Development and Conflict Management 2009) and the *IISS Military Balance 2007* lists 345 armed groups in the world (Hackett 2007, pp. 422–438).

[2] Some pioneering exceptions include *Rethinking violence* (Chenoweth, Lawrence 2010), *The Politics of Collective Violence* (Tilly 2003), *Contentious performances* (Tilly 2008).

[3] This paper presents preliminary results of the ongoing dissertation project with the same name expected to be completed later this year. The dissertation focuses not only at the political context for causal explanations on variance in agency as this paper does, but also includes the analysis of the internal dynamics of contention through a map of the agency of non-state actors and investigates both the context and agency for their correspondence. The identification the mechanisms and processes linked to a specific outcome in terms of claim-advancing performance lies at the forefront.

the actual case study. It begins with a brief description of the methodology before applying the DOC within the context of the People's Party Revolution of the Philippines from 1983-1986.

The DOC and Variance in Agency

Boudreau points to the lack of social movement approaches developed in industrial settings applied to cases in the South (Boudreau 1996). And although some analyses have already ventured in this direction, there is still the problem of providing appropriate theoretical extensions, which make their application rewarding. To this end, he suggests the inclusion of opportunity structures. Their application ensure the study of the relationship between structural conditions, forms of activity, and given or perceived opportunity – aspects, which allow for a more complete analysis for cases of contentious politics located in the South (Boudreau 1996, p. 186). In other words, "analysis will naturally ask how movement activity is perceived by the collective, and how the larger structural environment, by altering the prospects of collective activity, also alters those perceptions" (Boudreau 1996, p. 187). Against this background, this paper wants to contribute to the increasing application of opportunity structures through the application of the DOC to explanations of performance[4] variability within contentious politics of the South. In particular, it focuses on applying social movement theory to study pro-democracy movements. This research objective is especially relevant considering the recent pro-democracy movements referred to as Arab Spring.

The DOC is a derivative of the political process approach, which is still predominantly used in the analysis of social movements. The political process approach concentrates on explanations for contention, specifically on explanations on the emergence of social movements and on the identification of features of a political context that facilitate or constrain contention (Human Security Report Project 2011), and also analyzes the given opportunities and perceived threats for claim-advancing non-state actors. Yet, the analysis of variance in agency requires not only a framework focusing on the emergence of social movements, but a theoretical model which also seeks to study the trajectories of political contention, including trajectories and their specific outcomes. The DOC fulfills these requirements[5] and facilitates the explanation of trajectories of agency, outcomes of activities, and "tactics that contribute to a recasting of the political context" (Human Security Report Project 2011, p. xviii).

The results presented in this paper were evaluated on the basis of one premise - that variance on agency is partially context-dependent[6] as suggested by the DOC. When referring to the

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[4]This paper applies the term performances in the DOC tradition, which is defined as "relatively familiar and standardized ways in which one set of political actors makes collective claims on some other set of political actor" (Tilly, Tarrow 2007, p. 11). Together performances make up repertoires of actions.

[5] It includes various distinctive features compared to the political process approach: "Identification of 'contentious politics', rather than collective action, protest, or conflict, as the object of study; insistence on a dynamic, relational understanding of contention; preference or a systematic and comparative study of multiple contentious episodes; and employment of mechanisms and processes as fundamental explanations" (Tilly 2008, p. xv).

[6] Context-dependency is a recurring term in the *Dynamics of Contention Program.* It is also an assumption, which already has been implied amongst others in *Man, the state, and war* by Kenneth Waltz (Waltz 2001), *Regimes and Repertoires* by Charles Tilly (Boudreau 1996) *Contentious Performances* by Charles Tilly (Tilly 2008) *Insecurity and Opportunity in Conflict Settings* by Gavan Duffy (Duffy 2009), *Protest and Political Opportunity* by David Meyer (Meyer 2004), *Dynamics of Contention* by Doug McAdams, Sidney Tarrow and

political contexts, this study adopts the DOC's threefold perception "as regimes, within regimes, as political opportunity structures; and within political opportunity structures, as sketches of the strategic situations faced by claim-making actors" (Tilly 2008, p. 12). Based on this perception: a regime consists of regular relations among governments, established political actors within its jurisdiction plus the relations among those actors (Tilly, Tarrow 2007, p. 45); a political opportunity structure (POS) refers to features of regimes and institutions that open or close spaces for a political actor's collective action and to changes in those features (Tilly, Tarrow 2007, p. 49); and finally, "sketches of strategic situations close in on the positions and relations of crucial actors as they approach the making of collective claims" (Tilly 2008, p. 12).

The DOC and its theoretical extensions on regimes and repertoires, from here on only referred to as DOC, focus on the political context of contentious politics on the one side, and on the performances and repertoires of the non-state actor on the other. The DOC sees violence, and nonviolence for that matter, in terms of collective action channeled into performances to advance a claim; a performance is seen as a process in a subset of a larger phenomenon of the conceptual approach to contentious politics. The causality of employing violence while advancing a claim can thus be also traced back to the opportunities available and the threats perceived within a regime and not as a natural outcome of conflict, or a degree of it. The figure below visualizes how claim-advancing performances are shaped and constitutes the backbone of the theoretical explanation to variance in agency based on the DOC.


Figure 1: Explaining Variance in Agency according to the DOC (Tilly 2008, p. 210)

Figure 1 visualizes how the performance as the outcome is influenced both from above and below. On the one hand, "regimes reshape themselves and thereby alter political opportunities, thus transforming repertoires" (Boudreau 1996, pp. 90–91). On the other, the same can be said for the

repertoire of the claim-makers. Repertoires are shaped by the collective memory available to the claim-makers and thus by the historical context of the non-state actor advancing a claim, as well as by the nature of the contention itself. The thick arrows represent the most common causal stories drawn from the DOC, while the thin arrows stand for a sample of other potential existing causal stories. The area separated by the large square on the upper half of the matrix denotes the theoretical scope applied and presented in this paper.

Since this paper concentrates on the analyses of explanations of variability from above, the DOC proposes the analytical tools known as the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) and the use of a capacity-democracy space (see Figure 2) to identify context-dependent factors within contentious politics. The capacity-democracy map is based theoretically on Aristotle's classification of regimes (McAdam et al. 2001). It consists of a two dimensional model capable of reflecting the *capacity* levels of the state to deliver a functioning infrastructure, and in which non-state actors may seize or lack the opportunity to realize their goals depending on the level of existing *democracy* to do so[7]. Figure 2 shows a space adapted from the DOC with varying high (max of 1) and low (min 0) levels of capacity on the vertical axis or democracy on the horizontal axis[8]. The resulting regime space can be used for two purposes: It can either track the development of a regime over time, as this paper does and which would be a more dynamic analysis of regimes, or place one or more regimes in it for comparison at a time of interest, which would be a more static analysis of regimes.


Figure 2: Capacity-democracy regime space

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[7] „Two big differences among the regimes across the world matter most to contentious politics: governmental capacity and extent (or lack) of democracy. *Capacity* means the extent to which deliberate governmental action affects the character and distribution of population, activity, and resources within the government's territory. … *Democracy* means the extent to which people subject to a given government's authority have broad, equal political rights, exert significant direct influence (e.g., through competitive elections and referenda) over government personnel and policy, as well as receive protection from arbitrary action by governmental agents such as police, judges, and public officials" (Boudreau 1996, p. 55).

[8] It also is possible to array regimes along other dimensions, such as size, dominant classes, relations to markets, multiplicity of internal governments and directness of central control (Boudreau 1996, p. 28). However the parameters capacity and democracy (1)"have attracted more theoretical and empirical attention from students of popular politics than have such aspects as uniformity of governmental administration or multiplicity of governmental units. (2) Within recent centuries they have made very large differences to the character, trajectories, and dynamics of contentious politics. (3) Even over the long run, the position of a regime with respect to capacity and democracy has (as any good Aristotelian would expect) profound effects on the quality of its contentious politics" Boudreau 1996, p. 28.

McAdam et al. point out that the capacity-democracy space provides an excellent way of visualizing where contentious processes began and ended, and in combination with the POS, it allows for the examination of the role contentious episodes in the trajectories of political shifts (McAdam et al. 2001, p. 79). The data needed to trace regimes within this space can be gathered by taking into account "the replacement of indirect by direct rule, the penetration by central states of geographic peripheries, the standardization of state practices and identities, and instrumentation" for the capacity axis, and "the breadth of polity membership, equality of polity membership, strength of collective consultation among polity members with respect to governmental personnel, policy, and resources" for the democracy axis (McAdam et al. 2001, pp. 78–79).

The second analytical tool is the POS. It is one of the central concepts of the political process model and generally understood to be the structural definition of the political environment, a way of understanding and quantifying how movement action is defined by the larger political context (Della Porta, Diani 2006). The POS, championed by Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, gradually emerged from the social movement literature (McAdam 1996). Eisinger is credited to having first used this framework in 1973 (Della Porta, Diani 2006; Meyer 2004). As is the case in the political process perspective, the DOC infers that explanations as to how and why repertoires and performances vary can also be derived from an analysis of the given POS within a regime[9]. The POS reveals a specific environment of political opportunities and threats to which claim-makers necessarily respond (Eisinger 1973; Meyer 2004; Duffy 2009). The role of the POS is related to the importance of linking performances by claim-makers to a given regime structure attached to a mutually exclusive territory, and although the POS is a contested notion[10], it still seems as the most viable tool to visualize the trajectories of contention based on the available opportunities and threats within a given context.

The DOC has found a way of illustrating the connection of agency and structure by compiling six variables or "features of regimes that affect the likely outcomes of actor's possible claims" (McAdam et al. 2001, p. 4) they consider relevant within lethal conflicts and have incorporated them to the already established idea of the POS. Opportunities and threats within contentious politics are now analyzed using the following variables: (1) The multiplicity of independent centers of power within the regime/coherence of the elite within the regime; (2) the regime's openness to new actors; (3) instability of current political alignments; (4) availability of influential allies or supporters for challengers; (5) the extent to which the regime represses or facilitates collective claim making; (6) decisive changes in items 1-5/ pace of change (Boudreau 1996; Tilly, Tarrow 2007; McAdam et al. 2001). Tilly provides an example of how some of the variables may affect the perceived opportunities and threats:

> "stable alignments generally mean that many political actors have no potential allies in power. By such a definition, however, POS varies somewhat from one actor to another; at the same moment, one actor has many available allies, another a few.

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[9] The POS is in no way used to rate a regime on a normative scale. Its application here and sole purpose is to identify the connection between regimes and contentious politics.

[10] The notion of generating a valid reflection of a given political opportunity structure is contested by some scholars (Goodwin, Jasper 2004); (Meyer 2004). Tarrow summarizes the discussions in two arguments in his book *Power in movement*: First, whether it is possible to identify opportunities and threats reliably and independently of the contention they are supposed to explain, and second, to what extend the causes of contention lie in the perceptions and creativity of individual actors rather than in the environments they inhibit (Tarrow 1998). Also, Goodwin and Jasper (2004) criticize three aspects of using the idea of the POS: its inconsistent application, it supposedly denies human agency, and finally it remains unverifiable because it only applies after the fact. However, although the POS has often been used inconsistently, it neither denies human agency since the POS can only shape contention through human agency, nor does it remain unverifiable since it is perfectly possible to specify POS independently of the changes in contention (Tilly 2008, p. 91).

For all actors, in any case, threats and opportunities shift with fragmentation or concentration of power, changes in the regime's openness, instability of political alignments, and the availability of allies" (Boudreau 1996, p. 44).

This being said, decreasing elite coherence, increasing regime openness, rising instability in political alignments, the availability of new allies to challengers, increasing facilitation and decreasing repression, and finally an acceleration in any of the above mentioned indicators leads to increasing opportunities in the given POS. On the other hand, an increasing solidarity between the elite, decreasing regime openness, rising stability of political alignments, disappearance of allies leading to power loss, decreasing facilitation and rising repression, and a deceleration in any of the above lead to increasing threats in the given POS. Considering these variables, it is quite clear that the regime has a great impact on the available opportunities or threats of claim-makers, in fact it has a great impact in shaping it, and hence also shape variance in agency. The DOC therefore stipulates that regimes and repertoires affect each other continuously through their interaction. On the one hand, "regimes reshape themselves and thereby alter political opportunities, thus transforming repertoires" (Boudreau 1996, pp. 90–91), which also constitutes the subject of this paper; on the other, performances are shaped by the collective memory available to the claim-makers, by the historical context of the non-state actor advancing a claim, as well as by the nature of the contention itself.

However, in spite of all the benefits that the DOC approach brings into this dissertation, it also neglects two major inputs of causation: change and variation in regime political economies, and interactions among regimes (Tilly 2008, p. 210). And instead only focuses on clarifying causal connections between regime characteristics and the nature of contentious politics. The explanations rendered in here thus remain incomplete, but useful in showing tendencies for variance in agency or explanations in variability. In addition, this apparent simple logical deduction on variance of agency in contentious politics cannot simply be reduced to an explanation of pure mechanics. Of course it is possible for the governing body to react to claim-making performances and thus shape the opportunities or threats available for the claim-maker[11].

Methodology

Since the main focus of this section is to analyze variance in agency considering context-dependent factors based on the DOC, it suggests the implementation of the capacity-democracy regime space and the analysis of the POS to study contentious politics from above. The Philippines People Power Pro-democracy Movement (PPP) from 1983-1986 has been selected for the application of the theoretical approach proposed by the DOC. The case selection is based on four robust parameters. First, The PPP features an asymmetrical conflict, where non-state actors, as subjects, make claims on the state as object.

Second, there is a variation in the dependent variable, which is variance in agency. Also, violent and nonviolent performances exist at the same time for the same episode of contention and the same context – the PPP. Selecting cases that contain both nonviolent and violent campaigns facilitates the within-case analysis, and reduces the confounding effects of other factors that may

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[11] The study on *Dissent, Repression and Inconsistency* by Gallagher Cunningham and Beaulieu opens up an interesting point of discussion in this respect. Targeted repression *only* does not necessarily render the hoped for outcome of the government. The consistency or inconsistency of repression on the other hand, seems to play a larger role in inducing dissidents to change their tactics than the frequency of repression alone (Gallagher Cunningham, Beaulieu 2010, p. 173).

influence the outcome (Brady, Collier 2004). It is important to note that this study also presumes that both methods, violent and nonviolent, are employed to make claims on authorities by either institutional or extra-institutional routines[12], and omits a normative debate of the means in general.

Third, there is considerable variation in the independent variables, which make up the POS[13]. Specifically, the variables (2) and (5) - the openness of the regime to new actors, and the extent to which the regime represses or facilitates collective claim-making– affect the threats or opportunities available to advance claims (Boudreau 1996, p. 75). In addition, from the standpoint of a whole regime, the variables (3) and (4), instability of current political alignments and the availability of influential allies or supporters for challengers amount to the same thing. This paper studies the interplay of the given POS and determines the resulting state of the political context, as either open or closed – meaning there are opportunities available or an increase in threats. However, more important than the actual situation in terms of degree of openness or closure is the subjective perception of the non-state actor itself.

Fourth, in light of the recent surge of pro-democracy movements in the Middle East referred to as Arab Spring, the PPP seemed to represent a case featuring comparable criteria, such as a pro-democracy movements in a highly authoritarian regime. It is also a case which lies in the past. The analysis of possible trajectories might therefore be of use for other cases fitting the same criteria. And finally, the PPP is also a very interesting case, where contentious politics emerged in a highly repressive setting within a long history of authoritarianism and political violence.

The methodological approach applied here attempts to capture the changing POS during the PPP to identify regime trajectories and performance outcomes, by non-state actors based on the DOC. And since this paper presents only context-dependent factors influencing variance in agency, it does not provide thick descriptions, new primary data or holistic historical explanations of each episode of contention, nor any attempt to isolate necessary and sufficient conditions for a particular outcome. This paper, and the greater project it is part of, is an attempt to construct an analytical framework that may be useful to scholars studying pro-democracy movements in the South. It attempts to do so by illustrating how the political context influences the trajectories of claim-advancing performances within contentious politics. For this purpose, it primarily relies on external and secondary sources to glean this evidence. Especially, wire reports like LexisNexis or external data bases, such as the US government's Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) or the BBC provide reliable information on the PPP, as well as Freedom House Reports, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch; secondary analyses by movement or area specialists complement the external sources.

Placing the Philippine People Power Movement in its Historical Perspective

The PPP succeeded in ending Ferdinand Marcos' autocratic rule lasting 17 years[14]. And although it started in 1983 triggered by the assassination of Benigno Aquino, Marcos most politically

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[12] Institutional means are performances allowed to be applied within a given regime. In other words, activities which can be performed without fear of repercussions or state repression and "operate inside the bounds of institutionalized political channels" (Tilly 2008, p. 6); extra-institutional means imply the opposite meaning.

[13] (1) The multiplicity of independent centers of power within the regime/elite coherence; (2) the regime's openness to new actors; (3) instability of current political alignments; (4) availability of influential allies or supporters for challengers; (5) the extent to which the regime represses or facilitates collective claim making; (6) decisive changes in items 1-5.

[14] Ferdinand Marcos was elected for President the first time in 1966. The elections were free and followed constitutional rule. His second term also started out legally in 1969; however, after imposing martial law in

dangerous opponent, an active opposition against autocratic rule had been already in place for years. The assassination succeeded in "solidifying and broadening the opposition to the regime and set in motion a series of institutional challenges" (McAdam et al. 2001, p. 108) eventually leading to the end of his rule in February 1986.

The Philippines hosted several episodes of contentious politics. The dynamic application of the capacity-democracy space provides a good starting place to visualize the trajectory of the regime in the face of contentious politics from the start of Marcos first term as President to 1987 a year after the PPP. Even though the focus of this analysis is from 1983-86, the climatic stage of the struggle, it is still very important to contextualize the episode of interest historically, especially since the emphasis here is put on context-dependent factors influencing variance in agency. Figure 3 fulfills the first part of the strived for historical contextualization. It illustrates how the regime of the Philippines started out and ended in very different settings over the course of Marcos' rule based on the parameters provided by the DOC[15].


Figure 3: The Regime Trajectory of the Philippines from 1946-1987

From its independence in 1946 and through the 1950s, the Philippines were subject to wasteful patronage, which prevented state institutions from developing autonomous power; what is more, "elites viewed constraints on state capacity as a generally good thing" (Boudreau 2009, p. 69). Marcos rose to power in the context of what Anderson calls a "cacique democracy" (Anderson 2002). Once he became President in 1966, he started to consolidate his power by centralizing state institutions especially the military, patronage, and state monopolies.

1971, it ceased to be so. He was forced out of office and into exile in 1986. The 17 years refer to the time from 1969-1987.

[15] Considering "the replacement of indirect by direct rule, the penetration by central states of geographic peripheries, the standardization of state practices and identities, and instrumentation" for the capacity axis, and "the breadth of polity membership, equality of polity membership, strength of collective consultation among polity members with respect to governmental personnel, policy, and resources" for the democracy axis (McAdam et al. 2001, pp. 78–79).

Early protest activity had already been underway during Marcos first term. Students, farmers and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) occasionally supported by the Church, generated most of the protest, which revolved around grievances concerning current agrarian policy, against the centralization of power, and for a fair Constitutional Commission (Chenoweth, Stephan 2011, p. 148). At the same time, there were also two armed challenges to the regime. The National People's Army (NPA), the military wing of the CPP, led the leftist insurgency in the North and the Muslim Mindanao independence movement had its base in the South. Marcos' attention was foremost to the North, since the Muslim separatist movement did not disrupt his state-building projects the way the leftist insurgency did (Boudreau 2009, p. 139).

Martial Law in 1972 marked the end of what Schock describes as "formal, albeit elitist, democratic policies in the Philippines and the beginning of a neo-patrimonial dictatorship" (Schock 2005, p. 68). His justification for its necessity was based on an exaggerated allegation of an incumbent communist threat, to the goal of eliminating corruption, and to initiate land reform (Schock 2005). In fact from that time on, Marcos referred to his rule as *New Society*. Yet, the so-called communist life and death threat did not exist at that time, but ironically came to exercise some power by the mid-1970s. The dramatic expansion of the left was fueled by martial law after Marcos closed down institutional channels for claim-advancing performance.

At its initiation, martial law even had a 'patina of progressive legitimacy' (McAdam et al. 2001, p. 110) and was supported by a substantial social base, the political center at the beginning. In reality however, Marcos' reason for martial law was his struggle to remain in power by the end of his legal presidency and take the wind out of his most prominent political opponent Benigno Aquino:

> "Marcos needed to prepare either to leave office, or to circumvent constitutional regulations. The 1971 to 1972 political crisis was hence not a crisis for state institutions, but for their incumbents. With the language and methods of anti-communist authoritarianism globally accessible, Marcos saw that he would gain international support for authoritarian rule by claiming a life and death struggle against leftist insurgency; he abetted the impression by faking attacks on his officials, and staging explosions around Manila" (Boudreau 2009, p. 74).

The Philippines moved from the low capacity/high democracy quadrant since the first term of Marcos Presidency in 1966 to the low capacity/low democracy quadrant in 1972 with the beginning of martial law. Up to that time, state capacity had been kept at a low at the convenience of the local oligarchy. Marcos continued in this tradition during his first term by systematically 'institutionalizing cronyism' (Chenoweth, Stephan 2011, p. 147). The consolidation of his power was particularly visible within the armed forces. He initially retained the Ministry of National Defense portfolio and reorganized the military. The goal here was to break previously existing ties from the regional oligarchy and shift the loyalty to him (Boudreau 2009, p. 71).

With the onset of martial law, Marcos was able to advance his state-building efforts, which is reflected in the slight rise in capacity. His focus at that time was dominantly on the consolidation of his power. Nevertheless, protest activity came nearly to an end until the opposition was able to recover by 1975 (Hedman 2006; Thompson 1995). Boudreau characterizes his authoritarian crackdown as distracted, since he did not get rid of moderate dissent (Boudreau 2009, p. 135). In fact, Boudreau describes a state in which "the boundary between tolerable and illegal dissent, fostered an immobilizing confusion among opponents, and allowed the regime to depict repression as incidental, rather than central to the exercise of state power" (Boudreau 2009, p. 142). The only form to legally voice dissent was left through the courts, which Marcos had left functional to make his rule by presidential decree appear legitimate. The only other institution which he failed to reign in was the Catholic Church. As a result, the opposition was driven underground; however, according to Wurfel it was not eradicated but dispersed (Wurfel 1991, pp. 114–153). Civil, legal and religious

institutions therefore provided cover for the opposition, which promoted the interaction between legal and underground struggle.

Nevertheless, his initial support from the US and from the Philippine elite began to wane by 1975[16]. Anti-Marcos resistance was able to recover, in part because "legal activists themselves made little headway against the dictatorship [however], the combination of the activity and armed insurgency formed a larger, more tenacious and disruptive movement complex" (Boudreau 2009, p. 139). In effect, coalitions were built between different factions of the opposition. And once the elite, representing the center became fed up with the "decay of Manila, the devastation of the university system, the abject and ridiculous character of the monopolized mass media" (Anderson 2002, p. 215), and with the country's economic decline, caused by the onset of world recession and subsequent financial crisis which "contributed to the unraveling of the political economy of 'crony capitalism' (Hedman 2006, pp. 289–290), Marcos was forced to change his course and initiated the Normalization phase signaling the end of martial law.

While Marcos remained in power through repression, he still relied on legalistic arguments and held a series of referenda and plebiscites in an attempt to certify his rule (Schock 2005, p. 69), which were unsurprisingly characterized by electoral manipulation, intimidation and threats. Nevertheless, interactions between the different oppositions, namely the reformists, the progressives, the revolutionaries, and the Church succeeded in limiting open[17] regime repression over the years of the broader anti-dictatorship movement right before the PPP. In fact, the broader opposition grew in strength and coordination in the early 1980s when the elite began to shift their loyalty away from the Marcos regime. Marcos responded to this internal threat by announcing *Normalization*, an attempt to pacify the US and national elites. Yet, the support dwindled anyway and the elite began its division between cronies, the new economic elite promoted by Marcos, and non-cronies, and in the military between more professionally oriented officers and officers owing their positions to Marcos.

By 1983, the communist armed insurgency continuously expanded, co-opting the reformist opposition had failed and they were even cooperating with the Left, elite divisions were more pronounced, and the Church was more and more critical of the Marcos regime (Schock 2005, p. 73). "Key institutional and ideological centers of Philippines society, once key allies, had grown openly hostile to the regime" (McAdam et al. 2001, p. 111). Additional reports on Marcos concerning health issues prompted his long-time political exiled opponent Aquino to return to the Philippines. He was assassinated upon the day of his arrival at the airport on August 21, 1983 and triggered domestic and international outrage (Chenoweth, Stephan 2011). And although about 2 million people attended his funeral procession spontaneously, Boudreau refers to the fact that the PPP was not composed of unorganized forces that overthrew the Marcos regime (Boudreau 2009, p. 176). In fact, the PPP built on the existing established networks, which had been formed during the anti-dictatorship movement beginning in the 1970s.

Much of the previously prevalent passive acceptance transformed to active political opposition and by 1985 Marcos had forsaken all his legitimacy (Schock 1999b). "Despite various political maneuvers, Marcos was never able to reestablish the generalized sense of stability and political order that might have undermined the shared perceptions of threat and opportunity that fueled the unfolding conflict" (McAdam et al. 2001, p. 114). Regime protest persisted for months and the established opposition strengthened relations amongst the center and the Left. In time, protest forms shifted from mixed mass marches to demonstrations of more discrete participant

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[16] By that time, the communist insurgency had already reorganized itself after the initial setback of martial law. The threat from the left, which had been Marcos main argument for imposing martial law suddenly existed and bought him some time (Boudreau 2009, p. 150).

[17] Boudreau attest that while open recession dropped, secret, extra judicial killings increased. Also, counterinsurgency intensified in the countryside (Boudreau 2009, p. 145).

categories (Thompson 1995). In response to the rising protest, Marcos called for snap elections to be held in February 1986. He decision was based on his past experience of successful manipulation of election results, and just as the last ballot was cast, he already proclaimed himself to the winner. Corazon Aquino, Beningo Aquinos widow, led a rally of over two million people proclaiming herself the winner and launching the triumph of the people campaign for civil disobedience.

As domestic and international opinion turned against the regime, members of the military moved against the government - Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Philippines Constabulary Commander Fidel Ramos initiated a military coup, with the goal of replacing Marcos dictatorship by a military junta (Boudreau 2009, p. 184). However, the Epifanio delos Santos Avenue protest, as it was known by changed in character when Cardinal Sins called for civil support. Various factions followed Sins appeal and were successful in forcing Marcos troops to retreat. This incident promoted the mass defection of soldiers and officers from the military controlled by the ruling regime. Marcos had lost all his legitimacy. On February 25, 1986 Corazon Aquino formed a parallel government and Marcos went into US exile.

Political Opportunities throughout the PPP

The lack of institutional access, regular and effective political competition, and institutionalized procedures for political succession are features often dominant in non-democratic regimes (Schock 1999a). The application of the Political Opportunity Structure to the PPP, a pro-democracy movement in the South, is very important in that it visualizes any sign of emerging opportunities or threats - a pre-condition to identify the context-dependent factors affecting variance in agency. The following section focuses on the independent variables identified relevant for the POS during the PPP, that is: (1) the level of elite coherence; (2) the degree of the regime's openness to new actors; (3) the given instability of current political alignments; (4) the availability of influential allies or supporters for challengers; (5) the extent to which the regime represses or facilitates collective claim making; (6) and finally decisive changes in items 1-5.

Elite coherence in the non-democratic context of the Philippines played a major role for the success of the PPP (Wurfel 1991). Schock provides quite a detailed overview of the pronounced decreasing elite coherence occurring by the early 1980s. The division ran along cronies and non-cronies from the business class and between professional officers and officers whose positions were based primarily on their loyalty to Marcos in the military (Schock 2005, pp. 72–73). The onset of the financial crisis unveiled the decay of Manila and the economic decline infested by corrupt patronage economies (Hutchcroft 1998). As a result, the moderate center and the business community became more and more dissatisfied, and the 'Faustian choice' between a repressive and corrupt state and the communist threat unraveled as the center became a real alternative to rightist authorities and the communist parties (Boudreau 2009, p. 151). Marcos tried to reverse the decreasing elite coherence by initiating the Normalization phase in the late 1970s, but it became clear by the early 1980s that no change was in sight. The major public outrage of Aquinos assassination in 1983, one of their own, revealed the rift along the center social base which had been underway for some time already.

Elite coherence was high during the first term of Marcos until the end of the 1970s. From that time on, it was clear that the coherence was decreasing. Aquino's assassination visualized the already existing rift and transformed the once silent acceptance of major elite factions to open critique and collaboration with the opposition. The anti-dictatorship movement thus faced increasing threats while elite coherence was strong. Once the dissatisfaction with the Marcos regime

increased by the mid end 1970s, elite coherence decreased and the opportunities for the opposition increased – a state which persisted lasted throughout the PPP.

Tracing political access within the Philippines or the degree of openness of the Marcos regime to new actors reveals that his increasing authoritarian rule had successfully closed down possibilities for new actors to emerge onto the political scene. His state-building efforts had effectively centralized the legislature and bureaucracies during martial law. The degree of openness towards reaching power wielding policy makers was therefore relatively small. The judiciary on the other hand, remained largely independent from his control, and an elite legal opposition was able to 'provide propaganda opportunities' and 'mainstream support' for the anti-dictatorship movement (Boudreau 2009, p. 136). Nevertheless, Marcos constructed a political order that had the appearance of a 'bounded punctuated liberalism' and consequently provided some spaces for the opposition even during martial law (Boudreau 2009). His efforts in this respect included various referenda and plebiscites throughout his rule, and although they were generally accompanied by manipulation and violence, they still had the effect of "demonstrating the possibility of political struggle against the regime and underscored basic regime abuses"… [In addition,] rather than satisfying moderate dissidents, they were often radicalizing experiences besides providing them with political experience" (Boudreau 2009, pp. 140–142).

Although the degree of openness was severely hampered by martial law, by the early 1980s, the opposition had established important links between different factions, built up networks, which were used to initiate mobilization and had reorganized itself. Towards the beginning of the PPP, Marcos was already incapable of shaping and channeling political demands and relied on a combination of repression and promises of future political reforms in order to deflect demands. The regime was not able to control the emergence of new actors to the degree of martial law levels.

The given stability of political alignments refers to the degree of alliances between political actors. During martial law, the degree of political alignments within the opposition was stable – meaning, alliances between oppositional factions (reformists, progressives, and revolutionaries) was almost non-existent. Also, Marcos electoral win and subsequent rule by presidential decree was supported by the political mechanisms existent prior to martial law or the PPP. Boudreau refers to the routine of electoral losers quickly accommodating themselves to the victors as a system of bounded political struggle (Boudreau 2009, p. 134). The patrimonial political culture of the Philippines played in his favor and eliminated any threats caused by instable political alignments to his regime (Wurfel 1991; Chenoweth, Stephan 2011). In the beginning of the 1980s the state of the alignments had changed in favor of the opposition. Links and alliances were becoming more frequent between different factions and between moderate and more radical flanks. By 1983, mobilization was channeled into broad and intensive protest, which "encouraged fairly extensive cooperation among the different opposition currents" (Boudreau 2009, p. 178).

The availability of influential allies to the non-state actor also has a direct influence on the opportunities available. The number and quality of allies has an effect on the power relationship between the subject making a claim and the object as the receiver of claims. In the Philippines, "the personalistic nature of Marcos' authoritarian rule did not affect the existence of autonomous institutions that did not directly threaten his interests" (Schock 1999a, p. 362). During martial law, those segments belonged to the strong social base supporting Marcos. Among them were the Catholic Church and the business class. Since open opposition had been made almost invisible in the beginning of the 1970s, the underground was forced to establish links with civil institutions (Thompson 1995; Boudreau 2009, p. 138). The anti-Marcos opposition emerged atop a largely organized base that eventually included NGOs, broad ideological organization, specific sectorial groups (i.e. peasant, labor, student and women's associations) church organizations, electoral and underground parties, and insurgent armies (Boudreau 2009, p. 148). By the end of the 1970s these former Marcos allies became more and more estranged, and their silent consent crumbled away.

They became more critical of the regime and shifted their favor towards the opposition movement, especially after the assassination of Aquino.

Another influential ally to Marcos and the opposition was the US. Before declaring martial law, Marcos sent and envoy ahead of to allay US anxiety, and carefully chose his justification arguments according to the overall rhetoric of an existent communist threat, since the Philippines depended on US American aid, investment and military support (Wurfel 1991; Hutchcroft 1998). However, as martial law lasted, the Carter Administration made it clear that US support would not only depend on how the threat from the Left was dealt with, but also on how the Philippines upheld human rights. And although the Reagan Administration initially continued to support Marcos blindly (Thompson 1995), some other faction within the US had already begun to side with the opposition movement by the early 1980s. Their support consisted of initiating a reform movement within the military and of backing the PPP movement (Schock 1999a). The assassination of Aquinos also turned out to be a turning point in terms of US support. Without the US, the Church, and most of the business class the existing opportunities for the opposition during the PPP increased dramatically and the end of the Marcos regime was only a matter of time.

The extent to which the regime represses or facilitates claim-advancing performances in terms of the POS "suggests that declining repression should promote movement mobilization and success while increasing repression should deter mobilization and inhibit success" (Schock 1999a, p. 361). Autocratic rule within the Philippines did not tolerate most of its political opposition. Nonetheless, by the onset of martial law, Marcos was more concerned with implementing state-building measures than with the removal of his adversaries. Political adversaries were detained, and protest was countered by violence, torture and assassinations were ever present, yet he did not pursue the complete elimination of open dissent or more radical opposition movements (Boudreau 2009, pp. 134–135). Martial law initially reduced open dissent to a minimum. However, by the mid-1970s the opposition had already reorganized. Hence, martial law and unchecked repression had the effect of successfully curbing open dissent, yet the dissatisfaction continued to expand and the opposition grew. The inconsistency[18] of enforced repression led to an "obscured boundary between tolerable and illegal dissent, fostered an immobilizing confusion among opponents, and allowed the regime to depict repression as incidental, rather than central to the exercise of state power" (Boudreau 2009, p. 142). Instead of quenching dissent as was Marcos intention, his repression led to the radicalization of moderate factions and mobilization was promoted (Wurfel 1991).

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[18] Up to date, several studies have tried to find out, if targeted state repression is able to induce dissidents to change their strategy of operation See Mark Irving Lichbach's and Ted Robert Gurr's *The Conflict Process: A Formal Model* in Journal of Conflict Regulation, Vol. 25, Nr. 1 (March 1981), pp.3-29; Ronald A. Fransisco's, *Coercion and Protest: An Empirical Test in Two Democratic States* in American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 40, Nr. 4 (November 1996), pp. 1179-1204, and Christian Davenport's *State Repression and Political Order* in Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 10, Nr. 1 (June 2007), pp.1-23. One which stands out with its results has been conducted by Cunningham and Beaulieu, *Dissent, Repression, and Inconsistency* Gallagher Cunningham, Beaulieu 2010. Cunningham and Beaulieu take the assumption of the capacity to induce a strategy change in non-state actors as a given and come to the conclusion that „states can cause dissidents to substitute violent and non-violent tactics by repressing one strategy (or by repressing it more than the other)" (Gallagher Cunningham, Beaulieu 2010 p. 194); however, their hypothesis on the relative effectiveness of deterrence of any kind of dissident activity (violent or nonviolent in nature) highly depends on the consistency of state repression. Inconsistency in state repression instigates even more violent agency by the dissidents.

Conclusion

The application of the capacity-democracy space and the POS to analyze variance in agency from above has been quite revealing in terms of the applicability of the political opportunity framework to the overall analysis of variance in agency within settings of pro-democracy movements in the South. Its successful application revealed its suitability to analyze the interaction between regimes and non-state actors advancing claim-advancing performances. It also provided some answers relating to context-dependent factors affecting variance in agency. The capacity-democracy space on the other hand, illustrated the trajectory of the Marcos regime from 1966-1986. It facilitated the analysis using the POS and visually contextualized the analysis of the PPP. Its added value is its analytical use to compare different cases with each other.

The analysis of the independent variables revealed that the given opportunities and/or threats followed expected outcomes for elite coherence, regime openness to new actors, stability of the current political alignment, and the availability of influential allies. The results obtained for the extent to which the regime represses or facilitates collective claim-making n the other hand deviated from the expected results. The imposition of martial law, which was accompanied by intensive repression towards the political opposition, decreased political opportunities and worked to lower open protest. By the mid-1970s however, protest activity had picked up where it had left, and what is more, underground and radical opposition were expanding drastically. Consequently, the consistency of repression seems to also play a role in promoting the type of protest activity, which is in line with Cunningham and Beaulieu's findings concerning the relationship of dissent and repression.

The second important finding is that specific constellations of opportunities and threats have a lasting impact on variance in agency. Future research needs to identify some of these constellations and test if some of them are transferrable. Within the context of the PPP for that matter, it has become clear that the increasing instability of elite coherence and the resulting increased availability of influential allies played a very important role for the success of the PPP. Moreover, the resulting increase in opportunities allowed the PPP to follow dominantly nonviolent performances. In addition, Aquinos assassination obviously plays a major role in the PPP, but it has also been revealed that various oppositional currents had already been underway since the beginning of martial law. Aquinos death did not unleashed an opposition movement, but triggered more mobilization, which then was able to use the networks and repertoires, which had already been used during the anti-dictatorship movement.

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